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U. S. ARMY CHAPLAIN SCHOOL

FORT SLOCUM, NEW YORK

BY

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SUBJECT: Chaplain portion, Post Nuclear S.O.P., CONUS.

1. PROBLEM: To develop guidelines that may serve as the basis for the Chaplain portion of the Nuclear SOP on any Post in CONUS. (For details, see Annex A, Problem.)

2. ASSUMPTIONS:
   a. The particular type CONUS Post will not be so severely damaged in an nuclear attack as to render it incapable of performing its mission.
   b. In addition to executing its military mission, the type Post will be directed to render aid to nearby civilian target communities.
   c. The Post Chaplain Section will be expected to support both the military mission and the civil defense mission.
   d. For details, see Annex B, Assumptions.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
   a. There are no existing DA doctrines or policies specifically governing the functions and activities of the Chaplain in a nuclear situation.
   b. In any situation, the first responsibility of the Post Chaplain is to support the mission of the Post. Chaplains assigned to TOE units lodged on the type Post will support the mission of their unit.
   c. The Chaplain's area of staff responsibility will continue to be religion, morals and morale. In a nuclear situation, emphasis will fall on maintaining or restoring morale, providing the ministrations of religion to the wounded, the dying and the bereaved, and in burying the dead.
   d. For details, see Annex C, Facts Bearing on the Problem.

4. DISCUSSION.
   a. In supporting both the military and civil defense missions of the type CONUS Post, the cellular-team concept offers the following advantages:
      (1) Flexibility - the composition and numbers of the teams can be tailored to the exigencies of the situation.
      (2) Control - a team, designated and trained as such, would be easier to dispatch, supervise, coordinate and re-locate than scattered individuals, acting individually.
      (3) Efficiency - the utilization of previously designated and trained teams would increase the effectiveness of Chaplain personnel in the nuclear situation.
   b. The only disadvantage of the team concept is that it requires certain chaplain personnel to act as a control group, thus preventing them, to some degree, from actively exercising their pastoral ministry.
   c. For details, see Annex D, Discussion.

5. CONCLUSION. The Chaplain portion of the Nuclear SOP of any CONUS Post should be written around the cellular-team concept, with emphasis on contingency planning, support of the Post mission and continuing training.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED. That in a subsequent Career Course of the U. S. Army Chaplain School, a Staff Study requirement include the writing of the Chaplain portion of the Nuclear SOP for a specific CONUS Post.

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ANNEXES: A--Problem
B--Assumptions
C--Facts Bearing on the Problem
D--Discussion

ANNEX A: PROBLEM

The intent and scope of this staff study is precisely as stated in par. 1, 'Problem': viz., "to develop guidelines to serve as a basis for the Chaplain portion of the Nuclear S.O.P...." It is itself, in no sense, such an S.O.P. Consequently, it deals with generalities and broad recommendations, which may serve to assist the particular Post Chaplain charged with the responsibility of writing the Chaplain portion of the Nuclear S.O.P. of any CONUS Post.

2.

ANNEX B: ASSUMPTIONS

a. We assume a situation in which the type CONUS Post has not been the target of a nuclear strike, or has suffered only damage of a nature insufficient to render the Post incapable of carrying out its mission.
b. The word 'Post', here and throughout, is taken to mean not only the geographical area of the military installation, but also the facilities, activities and personnel pertaining thereto.
c. In accordance with existing DA policy and directives it is assumed that the military will be called in to render a variety of services, should an adjacent civilian community suffer nuclear attack. These services may be categorized as follows:
   (1) Relief: e.g., medical assistance and services, providing food, shelter and clothing for survivors on an emergency basis.
   (2) Rehabilitation: e.g., restoring public utilities and communications, clearing debris, radiological monitoring and surveying, etc.
   (3) Security: e.g., control of traffic and crowds, prevention or control of panic, establishing supply and evacuation routes and guarding same, graves registration and/or mass burials, prevention of looting and sabotage in target areas, etc.

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ANNEX C: FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. Although there are no published directives or policies providing specific guidance for the Post Chaplain, in a nuclear situation, guidance and policy for the Department of the Army in its Civil Defense mission can be found in AR 500-70, "Emergency Employment of Army Resources--- Civil Defense' dtd 9 September 1960. Responsibilities and concepts outlined in this Regulation can be applied, by analogy and extension, to the role of the Chaplain section of a type CONUS Post.

b. From AR 500-70, three main concepts can be ascertained:
   (1) Military support is complementary to, but not a substitute for civilian participation in civil defense. (cf. par 5, (1) e).
   (2) Army readiness to execute civil defense emergency support missions will be accomplished by contingency type planning which takes full advantage of the existing organization, disposition and command structure of the Army. (cf. par. 7, (b) 8).
   (3) Training in Civil Defense will be conducted on a continuing basis....to the extent necessary to assure a capability to execute missions set forth in plans. (cf. par. 7, (b) 13).

c. It is evident from AR 500-70 that the first responsibility of the Post Chaplain section will be to support the military mission of the Post, although it may be called upon to support those services of relief, rehabilitation and security discussed in Annex B, as a secondary mission. In writing the Chaplain portion of his Post Nuclear S.O.P. the Post Chaplain should be aware that he will be dealing with civilian victims of a nuclear attack only secondarily, on a temporary and emergency basis, and should allocate missions to subordinate chaplains with this fact in mind. This does not mean that the military chaplain may not or should not be called upon, or directed to assist in succoring such victims. It does mean, however, that the military chaplain should not be assigned to this task unless and until full provision has been made for the requirements of military personnel and their dependents, and then only with the full knowledge and prior consent of the Commanding Officer.
   Some large Posts, with large chaplain complements, may find it possible to designate certain chaplains, as a team, to work directly in the disaster area, ministering primarily to civilian victims. Normally, however, subordinate chaplains should be assigned to already existing Post Disaster Units.

ANNEX D: DISCUSSION

a. In a nuclear situation many things will have to be done and done quickly, with a minimum of confusion and hesitation. Prior planning and thorough prior training are an absolute necessity. Communications on the type CONUS Post may be destroyed or inoperative; key personnel may be casualties. If every member of the Post Chaplain section has been thoroughly trained beforehand, and made aware of his duties and responsibilities, the effectiveness of the Chaplain section will be greatly enhanced.

b. However, in accordance with par. 7, b, (9), AR 500-70, planning should be sufficiently broad and flexible to permit operations under any forseeable condition. This flexibility of planning will be reflected in the Chaplain Nuclear S.O.P. only if there is a flexible concept of chaplain employment. There are three general methods of employing chaplains in a disaster situation:

(1) Central control - chaplains would work out of a centrally located control post, under the supervision of the Post Chaplain, who would dispatch them as need arises, to cope with various requirements. This method has the disadvantage of leading to duplication of effort, and inadequate control. It presents the possibility that the Post Chaplain may overcommit his personnel at one time or in one area, and be left with no reserve to commit if requirements should arise at another time or in another area. Chaplains committed thus would be difficult to supervise, and to locate. Moreover, random commitment of chaplains, as the need arises, does not permit the training of particular chaplains in particular duties. There is no point, for instance, in sending a hospital chaplain to accompany a Signal Corps detachment engaged in restoring communications.

(2) Area coverage - in this concept of employment, chaplains would be made responsible for chaplain support within a certain area of the Post, and/or to certain units not having TOE chaplains, within that area. Again, the objection to this concept is that it is too hit-or-miss. One area chaplain might have little to do, while, at the same time, another chaplain might be overwhelmed with pressing calls for his ministry. There would also be serious difficulties in providing adequate denominational coverage.

(3) Cellular-team concept - this concept of chaplain employment in a disaster situation offers the greatest amount of flexibility consonant with adequate control and prior training. Henceforth, these cellular-teams will be referred to as Chaplain Team, Nuclear, or CTN.
Each type team should further be designated by a numerical suffix to indicate its specific mission; thus, for instance, CTN-1 would indicate 'Chaplain Team, Nuclear, Control Group'. In accordance with this concept, subordinate chaplains can be assigned, in advance, to specific teams with specific missions, and trained in their particular responsibilities within the team. Each CTN should be attached to a larger Post disaster-relief unit or activity. Assignment to these teams should be made on a basis of denominational representation, available chaplain strength and proposed utilization of the type CTN.

ANNEX D: DISCUSSION (Cont.)

On a small Post, where there is, for instance, only one Jewish chaplain, it may be deemed advisable to assign him to CTN-1, for dispatch as circumstances dictate, or it may seem wiser to assign him to the CTN attached to the Post hospital. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for the assignment of chaplains to these teams. Circumstances, and available chaplain strength by denomination, must dictate what will be most effective.

c. A suggested CTN roster is given here, based on a strength of twenty-eight (28) chaplains. It is intended only to serve as a guide to the Post Chaplain who writes the Chaplain Nuclear S.O.P., and it should not be assumed that it will be found applicable in each and every circumstance.

CTN-1; CONTROL GROUP
This team should be in close proximity to Post Headquarters, (especially to the G-1 section) if the Post Hqs. deploys to alert positions, on or off the military reservation.
Post Chaplain (Protestant)
Deputy Post Chaplain (Roman Catholic)
3 EM
Attachments: 1 Jewish chaplain, and enlisted assistant.

CTN-2; POST HOSPITAL TEAM
5 Protestant
2 Catholic
7 EM

CTN-3; CIVILIAN RELIEF TEAM
This team is attached to the Medical team dispatched to the civilian target community.
7 Protestant
4 Catholic
1 Jewish
12 EM

CTN-4; MILITARY SUPPORT TEAM
Has responsibility for chaplain coverage of military personnel temporarily employed off-Post, and engaged in relief, rehabilitation and security missions. E.g., troops assigned to guard power-lines, bridges, re-establish communications, public utilities, clear debris, or conduct mass burials.
2 Protestant
2 Catholic
4 EM

ANNEX D: DISCUSSION (Cont.)

CTN-5; GENERAL SUPPORT TEAM
Available for unforseen emergencies, and for temporary relief and/or augmentation of heavily committed teams.
2 Protestant
1 Catholic
3 EM

d. The number of these teams, and the number of chaplains assigned to each, may be augmented or decreased depending on the number of chaplain personnel available and denominational representation. The Post Chaplain would do well to remember the principle of economy of force in making his assignments. He might also ponder the following words, written by the Rev. Donald Wolf, S. J.:

> "In past ages, Christian societies have not wanted for heroes among the clergy. Many are the examples that could be cited of clergymen giving their lives ministering to the physical and spiritual needs of men and women in plague-ridden cities and in the devastation of wars. My concern is not with the courage of clergymen. On that the laity can depend. My concern, rather, is with the know-how of the clergy. Has the clergy, either individually or as a group, considered the problems to be faced in a nuclear war?"
> (The Clergy in an Atomic Attack", AMERICA, Wolf, Rev. Donald, S.J., N.Y., Nov 4, 1961.)

e. In order that the various CTN work effectively, the Chaplain Nuclear S.O.P. should specify under what conditions the CTN become operative. Their activation should not depend on notification from the Post Chaplain. The Post Nuclear S.O.P. will probably have provisions in it for the notification of the various Post disaster teams. This may be done by means of a signal, such as a siren, or the senior officer of each Post team may have the responsibility of notifying key men on his team, especially if communications are out of order. In the latter case, it would seem that the senior officer of the particular Post team, should notify the senior chaplain of the CTN attached to his unit or activity. Thus, for instance, the senior medical officer of the Post Medical Team, which is dispatched to the civilian target community, should notify the senior member of CTN-3, the Chaplain Nuclear Team, Civilian Relief. The type CTN should be assigned an assembly area, should have primary and alternate means of transportation, enlisted assistants should be trained in their duties as team members, and certain equipment and supplies should be kept on an alert status. The Post Chaplain should note that AR 500-70, par. 7, b, (7) forbids the "earmarking, precommitting or otherwise setting aside certain forces or supplies for possible civil defense tasks". Consequently, it would be out of order for the Post Chaplain to set aside, for instance, a certain number of Chaplains' kits, or other Chaplain supplies for a contingency. However, it is not against the intent of the Regulation that subordinate chaplains be instructed to utilize Chaplains' kits and supplies already in their possession or in storage on Post.

ANNEX D: DISCUSSION (Cont.)

CTN members who may be working in potentially radio-active areas should be provided with film-badges or dosimeters. If certain TOE units, possessing unit chaplains, lodged on the type Post, do not deploy, provision should be made in advance to attach these unit chaplains to the various Post CTN. This will require coordination between the Post headquarters and the headquarters of the lodger units. In no case should the Post Chaplain build a CTN around unit chaplains, since they may not be available when the emergency occurs.

f. Although the team-concept of chaplain employment in a nuclear situation requires the use of CTN-1 primarily in a non-ministerial role, it is felt that the advantages to be gained by employing them as a control group far outweigh the disadvantages. Moreover, it seems certain that they will find large scope for their role as men of God within their own headquarters, immediately after a nuclear attack upon the United States. While continuing to function as a control group for subordinate CTN, they will have plenty of opportunity to contribute to the preservation of morale and the reassurance of personnel within the Post headquarters.

g. Source Material for writing the Chaplain Nuclear S.O.P. The Post Chaplain who is charged with the duty of preparing the Chaplain Nuclear S.O.P. should first familiarize himself with the Post Nuclear S.O.P. If the Post S.O.P. is not yet in existence, he should seek guidance from his Commanding Officer, through the members of the G-Staff, and certain members of the Special Staff, such as the Post Surgeon, and Post Transportation Officer. He may also consult, with profit, the Post Disaster Plan. He may also refer to the following sources of information:

(1) AR 500-70, dtd 9 Sept 60.
(2) North Carolina Civil Defense Agency, Operational Survival Plan, Annex K, Religious Affairs Service, dtd May 1958.
(3) "The Clergy in an Atomic Attack", op. cit.

h. The Post Chaplain should always remember that his mission is to support the mission of his Post Commander; he should therefore, avoid unrealistic plans involving massive aid to civilian communities; he should plan, not rigidly, but well; he should test his plan by carrying out practice alerts. If he incorporates into his Nuclear S.O.P. the three elements of contingency planning, support of the Post mission and continuing training, and if he builds his S.O.P. around the cellular-team concept his S.O.P. will be characterized by flexibility, control and efficiency.